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Corporate Efficiency, Profitability, and Value
Changes after the IPO
Daniel L. McConaughy, Manjeet S. Dhatt, and
Yong H. Kim

I. INTRODUCTION

Agency theory predicts that when owner-managers sell a portion of their share
in their firms, agency costs are incurred. They arise because the original
owner-managers’ incentives change since they no longer bear all of the costs
of the decisions they make. This suggests that when a firm undergoes an Initial
Public Offering (IPO), agency costs should increase. An increase in agency
costs should manifest itself in the form of reduced profitability, lower opera
tional efficiency, an d /o r lower firm value. This study compares the profitabil
ity, operational efficiency, and firm value over the 1985-1990 period of 100
firms that had IPOs in 1985 compared to a matched sample of similar firms
which had their IPO before 1980. We find that the 1985 IPO firms were more
profitable, operationally more efficient, had more liquid assets, and had
greater value over the 1985-1990 period.
Much of the IPO literature has focused on the short run performance of
IPOs and the hot and cold markets phenomenon (Downs & Heinkel, 1982;
Leyland & Pyle, 1977; Ritter, 1991). Recently, Muscarella and Vetsuypens
(1990) examine reverse leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Relative to a matched
sample, they compare the operating-efficiency and capital structure of these
firms just before they go private and then when they go public again. They
find that the reverse LBO firms emerged from private ownership more
profitable and productive. The changes in ownership affected by the LBOs
allowed the assets of the firms to be put to higher uses—agency costs were
reduced.
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The present research fills a gap in the IPO literature. An IPO is the
opposite of an LBO relative to ownership changes. The LBO affects a less
diffuse ownership structure, whereas the IPO affects a more diffuse one. Up
to the present, no one has examined the effect of the diffusion of ownership
caused by the IPO on corporate profitability, efficiency, and value. This study
looks at the reverse of what Muscarella and Vetsuypens examine.

n . PROBLEM
Research into corporate buyouts indicates that a concentration of ownership
increases corporate efficiency. This result is in line with the predictions of
agency theory, which also predicts that a diffusion of ownership increases
agency costs which reduce firm value. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that
the IPO would eventually increase agency costs.
Managerial incentives will change when ownership changes, and changes
in managerial behavior will follow in response to the changes in incentives.
Over time, these changes will manifest themselves in terms of changes in
profitabihty, operational efficiency, and firm value. We predict that firms that
undergo a diffusion of ownership via an IPO will become less profitable, less
operationally efficient, and less valuable.

m.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The SEC’s “Registered Offering Securities” (ROS) computer tape was used
as the sample data source to identify firms that had their IPO in 1985. We tise
only “firm commitment” common stock offerings. To control for industry and
size effects, we formed a control set of firms matched on the basis of the
two-digit SIC code, or closer, and plus or minus 25 percent of sales as given
by Compustat. We further defined the matched sample firms by requiring
them to have had their IPO before 1980 so that the sample firms would be
matched to firms which had existed for at least five years under a regime of
diffuse ownership. This provided a set of 100 pairs of firms with annual mean
sales of $82.7 million and median sales of $19.1 million in 1985. The largest
firm had sales of $1804 million and the smallest, $0,184 million.
The pairs of firms are compared on the basis of the following calendar
year ratios computed from Compustat: Gross Margin, Operating Margin,
Sales/Employee, Cash Flow/Employee, Sales/Average Working Capital, Cur
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rent Ratio, Sales/Total Assets, Market-toBook Equity, and Market Equity/To
tal Assets.
To test for significant differences in the median values of the data of the
matched pairs of firms, we employed the Wilcoxon Signed-rank test for paired
samples. Furthermore, to ascertain if the sets of firms differed significantly
over the whole time period for a given ratio, we took the average of the median
differences of each ratio for each one year period for each pair and tested if
they were significandy different from zero using the Wilcoxon Signed-rank
test.

IV. RESULTS
The IPO firms are slightiy more profitable. Operating margin was higher in
each period, and the significance of the differences over the entire six year
period is 0.11. Gross margin, after depreciation, was not significandy different
for the two sets.
The current ratio was higher for the IPO firms in each period, but was
nonsignificant in 1990. Nevertheless, over the whole period, the IPO firms
were significandy higher at the 0.03 level of significance. The decline in
liquidity most likely indicates that the sample firms put to work the cash
received firom their IPOs in 1985. This is reflected also in sales/average
working capital, which is significandy and increasingly higher in every period
for the sample firms. Over the whole six year period, the significance of the
difference is 0.002.
The IPO firms were operationally more efficient. Sales/employee was
significandy higher in each period with a significance of 0.02 over the six
years. Operating cash flow/employee behaved similarly, though it was much
more variable, being significandy different at the 0.04 level over the period.
Sales/total assets was initially lower for the sample firms but grew from 1987
on though the results are insignificant.
The IPO firms were more valuable as measured by market equity/book
equity and total market equity/total assets. In all periods the sample firms
were highly significandy different, but the differences shrank markedly over
the six year period. From 1985-1990, the differences were significant at the
0.0001 level. Fama and French (1992, p. 451) feel thatlow BE/ME firms have
persistentiy strong economic performance. The market seems to impute
increasing agency costs to firms after they go public.
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V. CONCLUSION

To summarize, the sample IPO firms were modestly more profitable, increas
ingly made working capital more productive, had more productive employ
ees, and were valued more by investors than the control firais which had been
public for at least five more years. Though the sample firms’ employees were
consistently more productive and profitability was modesdy higher, the
market imputed increasing expected agency costs as evidenced by a declining
market premium. The IPO changes managerial incentives which increase
agency costs for several years after the IPO.
NOTE

We have extended this study to 1992 and examined rates of change in the
financial ratios. The operating performance of the IPO firms significandy
improved over the 1990-92 period, suggesting that earlier investments were
paying off. The IPOs’ continued superior operating performance, along with
inferior stock market performance, suggests that investors overpay for the
growth prospects of firms at their IPO.
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